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Ten years into the euro experience, one can evaluate the extent to which the 
single currency has met its promises. This volume brings together the ﬁ  rst 
comprehensive collection of essays that help make such an assessment.
This introduction does two things: ﬁ  rst, we lay out what we think we 
learned from reading these chapters; then, we go one more step. The confer-
ence from which this volume is drawn took place in the midst of the ﬁ  nan-
cial crisis (in October 2008), but the chapters had been written long before. 
Thus, the issues raised by the crisis are touched on only marginally in these 
chapters. We address some of the lessons for the euro from the crisis in the 
second part of this introduction.
One issue that has emerged from the conference is that there are beneﬁ  ts 
from membership in the euro area as well as challenges. In tranquil times, the 
beneﬁ  ts (and costs) are sizeable, and many chapters discuss them in a variety 
of diﬀerent ways. But in a crisis, the beneﬁ  ts appear to be magniﬁ  ed.
Will the Euro Survive?
Is there a chance that the euro area might fall apart? This is the question 
addressed in chapter 1 by Barry Eichengreen. One can start asking what 
the answer to this question would have been before the 2007 to 2010 crisis 
and what it could be now. Before the crisis exploded, one might have been 
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worried that countries such as Italy and Portugal that were doing so poorly 
could have succumbed to the temptation to exit to be able to use competitive 
devaluations to get out temporarily from stagnation. Inside the euro, both 
countries would have needed large real wage adjustment to restore a balance 
between nominal wage growth, productivity, and inﬂ  ation. The possibility 
of either country abandoning the euro seemed rather remote, but the current 
Italian interior minister had expressed that view a few years back when not 
in oﬃce—and at some point, the issue was publicly debated in Portugal. 
Nevertheless, Eichengreen concludes that before the crisis, the event of a 
major country exiting and of EMU breaking down was highly unlikely in 
the medium run, and we agree. The crisis—perhaps paradoxically—has 
strengthened the euro area. Countries with traditionally weak currencies 
have realized that without the anchor of the euro, they would have experi-
enced a spiral similar to that of developing countries: a speculative attack, 
a balance-  of-  payments crisis, interest rates jumping through the roof, and 
so forth.
The Euro and Structural Reform
The main reason why continental Europe—that is, most of the countries 
that now form the euro area—in the past twenty years has been unable to 
keep up with growth in the United States—and also in the United King-
dom and in the Nordic countries—is its reluctance to reform. Has the euro 
provided new stimulus for economic reform? Or as the evidence sometimes 
suggests, has euro membership produced “reform fatigue,” in the sense that 
after having painfully met the Maastricht criteria, euro member countries 
have taken a break from reform?
Two chapters in the volume provide evidence on this question. In chap-
ter 2, Alesina, Ardagna, and Galasso investigate whether the adoption of 
the euro has facilitated the introduction of structural reforms, deﬁ  ned as 
deregulation in the product markets and liberalization and deregulation in 
the labor markets. They ﬁ  nd that the adoption of the euro has been associ-
ated with an acceleration of the pace of structural reforms in the product 
market. As for the labor market, the evidence is more complex. Reforms in 
the primary labor market have proceeded very slowly everywhere, and the 
euro does not seem to have generated much of an impetus here. On the other 
hand, in many countries—including many euro ones, such as France, Italy, 
and Spain—new forms of labor contracts have been introduced based on 
temporary agreements between employers and workers. The authors also 
explore whether the euro has brought about wage moderation: they ﬁ  nd 
evidence of wage moderation in the run- up (1993 to 1998) of euro member-
ship but not afterward. In chapter 3, Bugamelli, Schivardi, and Zizza further 
pursue this question from a diﬀerent angle and ﬁ  nd that productivity growth 
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competitive devaluations to regain price competitiveness before the euro was 
adopted. This ﬁ  nding is conﬁ  rmed when the authors analyze ﬁ  rm-  level data 
from the Italian manufacturing sector. They ﬁ  nd that low-  tech businesses, 
which arguably beneﬁ  ted most from devaluations, have been restructuring 
more since the adoption of the euro. Restructuring has entailed a shift of 
business focus from production to upstream and downstream activities, such 
as product design, advertising, marketing, and distribution, and a corre-
sponding reduction in the share of blue-  collar workers.
These results run contrary to our prior and challenge the view that entry 
into the euro has produced “reform fatigue.” They are encouraging for 
Europe, suggesting that at least in some parts of the economy—though 
probably less so in the labor market—ﬁ  rms have responded to the macro-
economic constraint imposed by the single currency and the single monetary 
policy by accelerating the pace of restructuring. These observations also 
bring to center stage issues of sequencing of labor market and product mar-
ket reforms, as discussed in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). Further work is 
needed to test this proposition, but these two chapters strongly suggest that 
the euro might have accelerated the creation of new ﬁ  rms (or newly restruc-
tured ﬁ  rms) and the destruction of older ones—those that used to rely on 
the temporary breath aﬀorded by competitive devaluations. If this is true, 
aggregate statistics—for instance, on the pace of productivity growth—
could be misleading, as they might reﬂ  ect a shift in composition: an accelera-
tion of ﬁ  rms exiting and entering. It would be important to extend the work 
of Bugamelli, Schivardi, and Zizza by using ﬁ  rm-  level data to investigate 
whether their ﬁ  ndings also apply to other countries that were previously 
characterized by high inﬂ  ation and repeated devaluations.
Business- Cycle  Convergence
Another debate that took place while the euro was being designed was 
whether the single currency would induce convergence or divergence in the 
economic performance of member countries. The argument in favor of con-
vergence was simple: a single monetary policy means no more idiosyncratic 
nominal shocks and thus one less reason for divergent economic cycles. 
The ﬁ  scal rules introduced with the Stability and Growth Pact added to this 
argument by limiting the size of idiosyncratic ﬁ  scal shocks. On the opposite 
side, increased economic integration (reduced transport costs, harmonized 
regulation, higher mobility of capital and labor) would have induced spe-
cialization. As countries, or regions, specialized in speciﬁ  c industries, they 
would have been subject to industry- speciﬁ  c shocks: this would have resulted 
in more, not less, macroeconomic divergence. The two mechanisms may refer 
to diﬀerent time horizons: specialization takes time, while more synchro-
nized nominal shocks were almost instantaneous with the creation of the 
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Chapter 4 by Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin investigates the changes 
induced by the single currency on the business cycles of member countries. 
The authors produce forecasts of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
of each euro member country, conditional on their per- EMU structure and 
the observed path of euro area-  wide growth. They ﬁ  nd that in the ﬁ  rst ten 
years, business cycles have hardly changed. In those countries that started 
from similar initial conditions in terms of real activity in the 1970s (Ger-
many, France, Italy, Holland, Austria, and Belgium), business cycles are 
very similar, and no signiﬁ  cant change can be detected since 1999. For the 
other countries (Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Finland, and Greece), there is a 
lot of uncertainty, and not much can be said—but in this group as well, no 
clear change since the EMU can be identiﬁ  ed. This ﬁ  nding has a remarkable 
implication. Countries that beneﬁ  ted from a large reduction in real interest 
rates after joining the euro, such as Italy, have not shown output growth 
rates that are signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent from countries that have faced smaller 
idiosyncratic shocks, such as Germany or Belgium. Moreover, although the 
costs of the elimination of exchange rate adjustments and of independent 
monetary policy are likely to have been diﬀerent across countries, this factor 
does not appear to have magniﬁ  ed asymmetries.
The chapter also asks whether the single currency has aﬀected the euro 
area-  wide business cycle. The authors forecast euro area growth condition-
ally on the pre-  EMU structure and on the observed path of U.S. GDP 
growth. They ﬁ  nd that since 1999, growth has been lower than what could 
have been predicted on the basis of historical experience and U.S. observed 
developments. The gap between U.S. and euro area GDP per capita level has 
been 30 percent on average since 1970, and there is no sign of catching up or 
of further widening. Thus, the introduction of the euro does not appear to 
have signiﬁ  cantly changed the historical transatlantic linkages. In spite of 
the relevant changes in the macroeconomic environment (the Great Mod-
eration, German reuniﬁ  cation, the euro area inception), the relationship 
between the U.S. and euro area real economic activity has remained stable.
The Euro and Infra-  European Trade
The extent to which cycles are correlated is related, among other factors, 
to trade between member countries. The eﬀect of currency unions on trade 
has received a large amount of attention since a very provocative paper by 
Rose (2000). This author ﬁ  nds an extremely large eﬀect of currency unions 
on trade: these ﬁ  ndings used evidence from existing unions, which, for the 
most part, involved small countries linked to large ones. A large literature 
has attempted to explain away the apparently unreasonably large eﬀects 
found by Rose, with an uneven amount of success. In chapter 5, Frankel 
ﬁ  nds a 15 percent increase in trade over just seven years (1999 to 2006): this 
is small compared to the large eﬀects found by Rose when studying other Introduction    5
currency unions—and Frankel goes thorough the possible explanations for 
this diﬀerence—but the eﬀect is by no means negligible. The question is 
whether a 15 to 20 percent increase in intraeuro area trade is big or small. 
Without the Rose paper, most observers (us included) would have concluded 
that 15 percent in just seven years is quite a sizeable number. Obviously, it 
pales relative to Rose’s number, but one should also consider that euro area 
countries were already quite integrated before the euro: further increases 
in trade of 200 or even 300 percent—the numbers found by Rose in other 
currency unions—are thus unlikely.
How the increase in intraeuro area trade aﬀects the correlation of busi-
ness cycles among euro member countries is an issue that remains to be 
explored.
Financial Integration
Could it be that the lack of stronger eﬀects of the euro on business cycles 
is the result of the slow pace of ﬁ  nancial integration? Two chapters in the 
volume address this question. In chapter 6, Kashyap and Gropp ask to what 
extent the single currency has created a single market in banking services. 
They go about it in a novel way by proposing a test of integration based 
on convergence in banks’ proﬁ  tability. They ﬁ  nd evidence of convergence 
for listed banks (where an active market for corporate control is likely to 
work) but not for unlisted banks. They conclude that the banking market 
in Europe appears far from being integrated—in contrast to the United 
States, where the proﬁ  ts of both listed and unlisted commercial banks seem 
to converge, and high-  proﬁ  t banks see their proﬁ  ts driven down quickly. 
Incomplete banking integration could be one reason why the euro has had 
almost no eﬀect on business cycles so far.
Chapter 7 by Alberto Giovannini focuses on a diﬀerent and often over-
looked aspect of ﬁ  nancial integration: whether the euro area has a single 
integrated market for securities. The chapter explains what a single inte-
grated market for securities entails, why eﬃcient arrangements to deliver 
securities to a counterparty (posttrading) are essential for such a market to 
function properly, and why we do not have it yet. The chapter reﬂ  ects on the 
political economic reason why this has not happened and suggests a path 
for future policy actions.
Fiscal Policy in the Euro Area
In chapter 8, Antonio Fatás and Ilian Mihov investigate the evolution of 
ﬁ  scal policy in the euro area. They do not present yet another discussion 
of the pros and cons of the Stability and Growth Pact but instead discuss 
the cyclical behavior of ﬁ  scal policy in the euro area from the point of view 
of the sustainability of ﬁ  scal stance, its cyclical behavior, and the behavior 6        Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi
of discretionary ﬁ  scal maneuvers. As a useful benchmark, they look at the 
ﬁ  scal policy of the United States. Given that reliable ﬁ  scal data are annual 
for most countries, and given the short life of the euro, it is quite diﬃcult 
to discuss with much conﬁ  dence this important subject, simply because we 
did not have enough time to evaluate cyclical patterns. The potentially large 
recession that is impending as we write (November 2008) may provide a very 
important observation in this respect. One of the most interesting conclu-
sions of this chapter is that ﬁ  scal policy in the European Union has been 
mildly procyclical. That is, it has not been used as a stabilizing tool. This is 
either because automatic stabilizers have not functioned too well or because 
discretionary spending has gone up in good times and perhaps has gone 
down in bad times because of the Stability and Growth Pact. This is in con-
trast with the United States, where the properties of ﬁ  scal policy seem more 
countercyclical. In our view, these results are driven by the fact that several 
EU countries made a ﬁ  scal eﬀort to be admitted into the euro area. Then, in 
2000 to 2001, when their economies were doing relatively well, rather than 
accumulating surpluses—as an appropriate ﬁ  scal policy requires—these 
countries relaxed. Not having the constraint imposed by acceptance in the 
euro area, their government started spending again. Whether this is a one-
  time event or a permanent procyclical bias of some European government 
remains to be seen. Certainly, those governments that have been ﬁ  scally 
irresponsible in the more recent and more distant past will pay the price with 
less ﬁ  scal ﬂ  exibility in the current recession.
Are Financial Supervision and the Lender-  of-  Last-  Resort 
Function Sound Enough?
The decentralized structure of euro area supervision and of the lender- of-
  last-  resort function has long been a source a concern. When the European 
Central Bank (ECB) was being designed, the inﬂ  uential paper “The Euro-
pean Central Bank: A Bank or a Monetary Policy Rule” (Folkerts-  Landau 
and Garber 1992) vividly made the point that the new institution was not 
really a central bank; rather, it resembled an automaton, programmed to 
set interest rates on the basis of some rule. Critics used to say that in order 
to turn the ECB into a real central bank, a crisis was needed—provided the 
crisis was not too serious; otherwise, it might take away the ECB altogether. 
The crisis has now happened, and it is more serious than anyone could have 
imagined. How has the ECB performed in the crisis?
Although chapter 9 by Cecchetti and Schoenholtz was completed half-
way through the crisis, it addresses a number of issues related to ﬁ  nancial 
supervision and liquidity provision. In the area of liquidity provision as a 
lender of last resort, the authors give high points to the bank’s management 
of the crisis so far. In August 2007, the ECB boosted liquidity supply early 
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turned cautious and alternative private sources of funding shut down. In 
order to deliver liquidity eﬀectively, the ECB utilized the broad ﬂ  exibility 
that it enjoys with respect to assets that it may accept as collateral or may 
acquire outright, including a variety of asset- backed securities. Some actions 
by the Federal Reserve came with a lag and were inspired by the ECB.
Cecchetti and Schoenholtz also discuss other, potentially more troubling 
aspects of the euro area stability framework. In contrast to liquidity matters 
that lie clearly within the ECB’s mandate, solvency matters are addressed 
exclusively by national institutions, which may have diﬀerent views about 
what constitutes a systemic threat and about how and when public resources 
should be employed. The fact that there is no euro area ﬁ  scal agent means 
that burden sharing across nations would be a challenge should a large (truly 
European rather than national) institution become unstable. Similarly, the 
decentralized structure of banking supervision—national supervision 
authority placed with diﬀerent institutions, depending on the country—
could create potentially dangerous incentive problems. These would not 
disappear by simply delegating the responsibility for supervision of national 
central banks—as some of the interviews on which the Cecchetti Schoen-
holtz chapter is based clearly demonstrate.
Has the Crisis Altered the Incentive to Join EMU?
In the ﬁ  nal two chapters of the volume, we return to the longer-term 
issues addressed by Barry Eichengreen in chapter 1: how long will it take 
for all twenty-seven nations of the EU to adopt the euro, and has the crisis 
of 2007 to 2010 altered the incentives to join the EMU?  To begin, misgiv-
ings about the euro in countries that were already in the union have com-
pletely disappeared. While several politicians—in Italy, but also in France 
and Spain—had complained about the straightjacket of the euro and the 
ECB policy before the crisis, since the summer of 2007, those voices have 
been silenced. The widespread feeling in Italy, for instance, is that without 
the euro, this country could have taken an Argentinean-  style route of wild 
depreciation and currency attacks to the old lira. At the same time, countries 
that had decided to stay out of the union are reconsidering the wisdom of 
their decision. Some countries such as Iceland that are not even members of 
the European Union are starting the membership process for the sole reason 
of being able to one day adopt the euro. Two chapters in the book reconsider 
the decision by Sweden and the United Kingdom not to join. Although these 
chapters were written before the crisis, some of the ﬁ  ndings are suggestive of 
why the crisis may have altered the incentives faced by these countries.
In chapter 10, Söderström ﬁ  nds that in Sweden, the exchange rate to a 
large extent has acted to destabilize rather than to stabilize the economy, 
pointing to the potential risks of an independent monetary policy. In chapter 
11, Di Cecio and Nelson, studying the UK experience, make a similar point, 8        Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi
suggesting that euro membership would eliminate shocks to the uncovered 
interest rate parity condition, which they identify as a major source of 
exchange rate variation.
So far in Sweden, the issue has been muted, because since the start of 
EMU, the exchange between the krona and the euro has remained remark-
ably stable—so stable that one could have argued whether the Riksbank was 
really targeting domestic inﬂ  ation. But since the crisis erupted, the krona has 
depreciated in a few months by almost 10 percent against the euro. This has 
confronted Sweden with a diﬃcult policy choice: either raise interest rates 
to stabilize the krona-  euro exchange rate (thus avoiding the costs identiﬁ  ed 
in chapter 10) or lower rates to avoid ﬁ  nancial trouble and a possible reces-
sion.
It is interesting that Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom reacted 
to the crisis by moving in opposite directions. Sweden and the United King-
dom have given up on exchange rate stability and have lowered rates, whereas 
the Danish central bank has intervened heavily in the foreign exchange mar-
ket and has been forced to raise interest rates from 5 percent to 5.5 percent—
a full 1.75 points higher than the ECB’s rate—in an attempt to stabilize the 
exchange rate.
As a result, a renewed debate about the beneﬁ  ts of euro membership has 
opened up in Denmark: some argue that the country should run a new refer-
endum on the euro. Even Iceland now speaks about the beneﬁ  ts of the euro, 
although this country is not even a member of the European Union. We read 
that diplomats from Iceland are making discreet inquires in Brussels about 
accession, and a poll conducted in October 2008 found that approval for 
EU membership among Icelandic citizens has increased from 48.9 percent 
to 68.8 percent in one year.
Willem Buiter and Anne Sibert (2008) argue that Iceland is only an extreme 
case of a more general phenomenon—a small country with its own currency 
and with banking sectors too large to be bailed out by national authorities. 
Others are Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland. The United Kingdom is 
larger, and according to Buiter and Sibert, also enjoys “minor- league legacy 
reserve currency” status (2). But some of the arguments apply to the United 
Kingdom as well. In fact, a renewed debate about euro area membership has 
started in the United Kingdom, too.
Similar problems have manifested themselves in Central and Eastern 
Europe. In Hungary, almost all mortgages are denominated in Swiss francs 
or in euros; currency depreciation has triggered a series of personal and 
banking failures. Thus, the country is struggling between the desire to sta-
bilize the exchange rate and the need to provide liquidity to the economy. 
Recently, the International Monetary Fund suggested that several countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe should consider adopting the euro, even 
without a seat on the board of the ECB. The reaction of euro member Introduction    9
countries has been cautious. But this is another sign that during a crisis, the 
umbrella of the euro seems especially valuable.
In summary, there is no doubt in our mind that the crisis of 2007 to 
2010 has altered the incentives to join the euro. It has also provided the 
countries that are already members with reasons to be more cautious about 
enlargement. The euro’s second decade promises plenty of interesting devel-
opments.
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